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Abstract 
Each new identified security threat class triggers new research and development efforts 
by the scientific and professional communities. In this study, we investigate the rate at 
which the scientific and professional communities react to new identified threat classes as 
it is reflected in the number of patents, scientific articles and professional publications 
over a long period of time. The following threat classes were studied: Phishing; SQL 
Injection; BotNet; Distributed Denial of Service; and Advanced Persistent Threat.  Our 
findings suggest that in most cases it takes a year for the scientific community and more 
than two years for industry to react to a new threat class with patents.  Since new 
products follow patents, it is reasonable to expect that there will be a window of 
approximately two to three years in which no effective product is available to cope with 
the new threat class. 
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1. Introduction 
Armies around the world are commonly criticized for their perceived lack of 
preparedness - during wartime, they find themselves fully prepared for the previous war 
fought, and they find themselves completely surprised and unprepared for coping with 
their opponents’ latest weapons and strategies introduced in the current conflict.  
In this paper we investigate how the professional and scientific security communities 
react to new security threat classes. We define a new threat class as a well-defined group 
of threats that have similar properties such as goal, method of performing the attack, etc 
Does the scientific community tend to provide timely solutions to potential threats as they 
emerge or alternatively, does it provide solutions to threats only once these begin to 
inflict damage? While some may argue that providing a solution to a hypothetical threat 
is problematic, as there is no way to evaluate the performance of the solution objectively 
against a collection of existing threats. Others might argue that putting a preemptive 
solution in place may prevent potential threat classes from ever emerging or inflicting 
any significant damage. In this study we look at the speed with which the scientific and 
the professional communities react to a newly defined threat class. Of course a threat 
class may exist long before it was defined and named by the scientific and professional 
community, and it is important to note that this represents one of this study’s limitations. 
We carried out this study by examining how fast the professional and scientific 
community reacts to a new emerging threat class. To quantify the response we 
investigated the relationship between the emergence of a new threat class and the number 
of associated publications and patents over time. Because the number of threat classes is 
enormous, we limited our study to a few threat classes with unique names commonly 
used by the professional and scientific communities. Their unique name is useful in 
identifying the relevant publications and in identifying the first time the threat class was 
mentioned.  
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The following threat classes were used:  
 Phishing (Reid, 2009) 
 SQL Injection (Strom, 2011) 
 BotNet (Kola, 2008) 
 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) (Mirkovic and Reiher, 2004) 
 Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) (Websense, 2011) 
We began by identifying when the new threat class initially emerged by determining the 
first time it was mentioned in a relevant context. We then totaled the number of 
professional articles, scientific papers and patents mentioning the threat class over time. 
Some may point out that using a new buzzword to define a threat class does not mean 
that the threat and the efforts to confront them did not previously exist. For example, the 
AIDS disease existed long before it was detected and named. We are aware of this 
potential criticism, yet we believe that, as in the case of the AIDS disease, when the 
number of victims increases, the threat is more thoroughly identified and more formally 
labeled. Following the definition of a new threat class it is easier for the community to 
develop dedicated mitigation techniques.  
In the remainder of the paper we introduce the threat classes with a description of each 
threat class, including the date of its first reference and a brief description of the incident 
that brought it to the attention of the professional and scientific communities. We also 
provide information sources for each threat class and describe where we derived 
information concerning the threat class and list the number of professional articles, 
scientific publications and patents associated with each threat class over time. The paper 
ends with a final summary and conclusions. 
2. Threat Classes 
The following five threat classes were investigated in this study:   
2.1 Phishing 
Phishing is considered one of the most common social engineering attacks. In a phishing 
attack the adversary’s goal is to obtain the victim’s personal information and/or security 
credentials by using fraudulent email messages (Hong, 2012). These messages are 
composed in such a way that the innocent victim is made to believe that they stem from a 
legitimate source. The information obtained in a phishing attack could include personal 
information which may be used for identity theft, and in many cases, tends to include 
account numbers, user names and passwords. Because phishing attacks rely on innocent 
internet users, as well as the fact that nowadays messages are sent from BotNets, it is 
very difficult to stop these attacks completely (Purkait, 2012). 
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According to Reid (2009), the term 'phishing' originates from adversaries using e-mails to 
'fish' for passwords and other private data from innocent Internet users. It is speculated 
that the letters, 'ph', are connected to naming conventions used by adversaries such as 
'Phreaks'. Phishing was first mentioned in 1996, in reference to adversaries who were 
stealing America Online (AOL) accounts. The first mention of the term phishing on the 
Internet was in “2600 hacker newsgroup” in January 1996, though the hacker community 
might have used this term earlier. The earliest public media reference to phishing was in 
March 1997. Tatiana Gau, Vice President of Integrity Assurance for AOL stated that, 
“The scam was called ‘phishing’ as in fishing for your password, but spelled differently.” 
In 1997, Ed Stansel, reporter for the Florida Times Union newspaper, was quoted as 
saying, “Don’t get caught by online ‘phishers’ angling for account information.” In this 
study, we will assume that the first reported phishing incident was in 1996 and that the 
first media report occurred in 1997. 
2.2 SQL Injection 
SQL Injection is an attack in which the adversary exploits the security vulnerabilities in a 
poorly designed web application (Clarke, 2012). These vulnerabilities allow an attacker 
to insert an SQL statement in the data entry field of the web application. The web 
application thereafter combines the inserted SQL statement with the statement that 
processes the data entry field. The consequence of the attack is that the attacker may read, 
update, or delete data stored in the database of the web application. Customarily, the goal 
of the attacker is to extract confidential information stored in the database and is 
generally associated with an intention to expose this stolen material via the web 
application. The confidential information may include credit card numbers and social 
security numbers. SQL Injection is an attack that can be easily prevented by the proper 
design of web applications. Unfortunately, today SQL Injection is still considered to be 
one of the most common attacks on web applications. 
The first SQL injection incident was reported in 1996 (Puppy, 1998). It raised concerns 
that in many implementations the user input to queries is not checked and is assumed to 
be compliant with the expected input.  
2.3 BotNet 
A BotNet is a group of compromised computers which are under the control of one 
attacker (Rodríguez-Gómez et al., 2013). Each compromised computer is considered to 
be a “robot”, thus deriving the term BotNet (roBOT NETwork). The victim’s computer is 
compromised by the installation of a Trojan horse which is in contact with the attacker 
via a command and control channel. Usually the BotNets are designed in such a way that 
the users of the victim’s computer do not suffer from a significant performance 
degradation of their computers. BotNets are commonly used to launch other types of 
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security attacks such as sending SPAM messages, distributing malware and launching 
distributed denial of service attacks. In many cases BotNets are created by one group of 
attackers which specializes in this domain and then are “rented or sold” to other attackers 
in order to perform their attacks. 
During the late 1990s, it was reported that several worms exploited the vulnerabilities in 
IRC clients such that the clients were remotely controlled (for example, IRC/Jobbo). 
SubSeven Trojan version 2.1 appeared in 1999 and allowed the SubSeven server to be 
remotely controlled by a bot connected to an IRC server. This development inspired the 
development of all the malicious BotNets. Thus, in this study we will assume that the 
first BotNet was reported in 1999. 
2.4 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)  
Attacks focusing on preventing the legitimate user from receiving a service are called 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. When the attacker uses multiple attacking entities in 
order to conduct the attack, the attack is called Distributed Denial of Service attack 
(DDoS). DDoS attacks may be launched by an attacker via a BotNet. DDoS attacks are 
characterized by the means to prepare and launch the attack, the properties of the attack 
and its effect on the attacked system/service (Mirkovic and Reiher, 2004). It is not easy to 
cope with DDoS attacks since it is very difficult for the defense mechanism to 
differentiate between malicious and benign traffic. 
DDoS attack was first mentioned by SANS Institute in August 1999. In this attack, 200 
compromised computers attacked a computer at the University of Minnesota (flooding 
attack).  Thus, in this study we will assume that the first reported DDoS attack incident 
was in 1999. 
2.5 Advanced Persistent Threat 
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are considered to be a new emerging threat; 
however, APTs very likely existed for many years before the term was used to describe a 
specific group of attacks. APTs are “cyber-attacks mounted by organizational teams that 
have deep resources, advanced penetration skills, specific target profiles and are 
remarkably persistent in their efforts” (Tankard, 2011). APT attacks are commonly 
launched by governments with great resources and usually exploit several vulnerabilities 
in order to achieve their goals. The goal of an APT is almost always very specific, such 
as disabling a particular function of the attacked entity or stealing specific information. 
APTs tend to work stealthily below the detection radar and are persistent in their activity 
until they achieve their goal.   
It is widely accepted by the computer security community that APTs were first 
mentioned by the U.S. Air Force, circa 2006, in order to describe complex (i.e., 
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“advanced”) cyber attacks against specific targets over long periods of time (i.e., 
“persistent”). Thus in this study, we shall assume that the first reported APT incident was 
in 2006. It is known that APT attacks existed before 2006, but at that time they were not 
distinguished from other attacks.  
3. Bibliographic Databases and Tools 
To measure research and development efforts by the scientific and professional 
communities for each of the five threat classes (as reflected by mediums including 
relevant papers and patents), we searched various bibliographic databases, each of which 
covers different materials or subjects (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Bibliographic Database 
Bibliographic Database Content Coverage 
Computer Database 
INFOTRACK  
An index for news and reviews in the computer domain. 
EBSCO Business Source 
Covers academic papers, market research reports, industry 
reports and mass media.  
Engineering Village  
Includes the following bibliographic databases: Compendex 
(scientific and technical engineering research), Inspec 
(computer science, information technology, etc.) and EI 
Patents (US and European Patents). 
Google Scholar 
Provides a search of scholarly literature across many 
disciplines and sources. 
IEEE Xplore Index for all IEEE journals and conferences. 
ISI Web of Science 
(Thomson Reuters) 
A reference and citation database that publishes the ISI 
impact factor for journals. 
Lexis-Nexis  An index for business and legal news. 
ProQuest  
A multi-disciplinary index for academic papers, 
professional articles and general news (e.g. the New York 
Times). 
ScienceDirect (Elsevier) Provides a search and full text access to journals and books. 
Scopus (Elsevier) 
An abstract and citation database of research literature and 
reliable web sources. 
SpringerLink 
Index for Springer journals, books and conferences 
(including lecture notes in computer science). 
 
We extracted the bibliographic records of all papers written from 1990 to 2012 that match 
one of the attack queries i.e., Advanced Persistent Threat (or APT), BotNet, Phishing, 
SQL Injection, and Distributed Denial of Service (or DDOS) in May 2013. Table 2 
specifies the number of papers extracted from each Bibliographic Database by 
Publication Type (scientific papers, professional articles and patents).   
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Table 2: Number of Papers extracted from each Bibliographic Database 
Bibliographic Database Number of Papers by Type 
 Academic Professional and News Patents 
EBSCO Business Source 514 2202  
Engineering Village 6418 1283 9 
Google Scholar 45839 3276 7160 
IEEE Xplore 1765   
INFOTRACK  170 6620  
ISI Web of Science 1972   
Lexis-Nexis  24086  
ProQuest 1685 23137 6 
ScienceDirect (Elsevier) 4210   
Scopus (Elsevier) 7790   
SpringerLink 8140   
Total 78503 60604 7175 
 
We used RefWorks to consolidate records from all sources. As the same reference can 
appear in more than one source, we used the “duplicate” feature in RefWorks to identify 
redundant references and subsequently merged the duplicates to create a single entry. 
Contradicting fields are resolved by counting the occurrences of each value and choosing 
the most common one. If values have equal frequencies, the value that was obtained from 
the source that is deemed to be more accurate is selected. For example, if the same paper 
appears both in Google Scholar and in Thomson Reuters Web of Science, but these 
sources happen to disagree on a certain field then the value of Thomson Reuters Web of 
Science is chosen for this field. The following priority list is used for prioritizing the 
sources: IEEE Xplore --> SpringerLink --> ScienceDirect --> ISI Web of Science --> 
Scopus --> ProQuest --> Lexis-Nexis --> Computer Database INFOTRACK  --> 
Engineering Village --> EBSCO Business Source --> Google Scholar. In total the meta-
data of 146,282 papers have been extracted. After completing the deduplication process 
72,221 items were left (about 49%). 
Our data analysis (described below) requires that each document be classified as a single 
medium (academic, professional or patent).  While most documents can easily be 
classified based on their publication outlet (an article published in Dr. Dobb's Journal will 
most likely be referred to as professional) or source (a paper indexed by SpringerLink is 
assumed to be academic), approximately 8% of the papers were automatically classified 
using ensemble learning algorithms (Rokach and Maimon, 2001; Menahem et al., 2009). 
We assumed that mediums are mutually exclusive, i.e., the same paper cannot be 
associated with more than one medium. 
 8 
 
 
4. Results 
In order to determine how quickly the scientific and professional communities and 
industry responded to a new threat class, we tracked significant milestones for each threat 
class by determining when each threat class was first mentioned in different mediums.  
Milestones included when the threat was first reported or defined, when the first patent 
was filed, when the first scientific paper was published mentioning the threat and when 
the threat was first mentioned in a professional article. The data for all threat classes is 
summarized below in Table 3. 
Table 3: Milestones - date threat class was mentioned in different mediums 
Threat 
class 
First 
reported 
(year)  
Paper Associated with 
the first report 
First 
mentioned in 
professional 
article 
First 
scientific 
publication 
First patent 
application 
APT 2006 (Websense, 2011) 2008 2008 2008 
BotNet 1999 (Canavan, 2005) 1999 2000 2004 
DDoS 1999 (Preimesberger, 
2013) 
1999 2000 2001 
Phishing 1987 (Felix and Hauck, 
1987) 
( Reid, 2009) 
1988 1988 2004 
SQL 
Injection 
1998 (Puppy,  1998) 1998 1998 2004 
 
One can quickly observe in Table 3 that in most cases it took a year for the scientific 
community to respond to a new threat class. It is reasonable to assume that patents reflect 
industry reaction to a new threat class (i.e., industry development of new products 
associated with the threat), and our study shows that it took industry between one and six 
years to react to a new threat class. One possible explanation for industry’s delayed 
reaction may be based on the need for industry to see a solid market demand related to a 
new threat class. 
Following the initial analysis of the material presented in presented in Table 3, we also 
determined the number of references in publications from 1998 through 2012 for each of 
the threat classes. The results are summarized below (Figures 1-5). 
In nearly all threat classes the number of references in professional publications is higher 
than that of scientific publications (with the exception of SQL Injection). It is interesting 
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to note as well, that on average there is a patent for each 10 scientific publications (with 
the exception of APT). 
 
 
Figure 1: Publications related to SQL Injection 
 
 
Figure 2: Publications related to Phishing 
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Figure 3: Publications related to BotNet 
 
 
Figure 4: Publications related to APT 
 
 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
P
u
b
lic
at
io
n
s
Publication Year
Academic
Patent
Prof
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
P
u
b
lic
at
io
n
s
Publication Year
Academic
Patent
Prof
 11 
 
 
Figure 5: Publications related to DDoS 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
Each year, new security threat classes are identified and defined, mainly by the 
professional community. Each of the defined threat classes includes a group of threats 
with similar goals and each is based on the same attack methods. The definition of a new 
threat class helps the professional and scientific communities share information 
concerning newly developed mitigation technologies.  
Our study shows that the scientific community reacts faster to a newly defined threat 
class compared to the professional community and industry (as reflected by the number 
of scientific publications, professional articles and patents). One possible explanation 
might be that the professional community and industry need further evidence that there is 
new market potential for a new class of products. It is reasonable to assume that it will 
take at least one year from the application date of the first patent to the appearance of a 
new product based on this patent. As a result, one can assume that systems may not be 
well protected against a newly defined threat class for at least two to three years from the 
time the threat class was first defined. This window of opportunity may be exploited by 
attackers who may react faster than the scientific community, the professional community 
or industry to new opportunities.  
One of our study’s primary limitations is that it does not present the correlation between 
the number of publications, articles and patents related to a threat class with the amount 
of damage inflicted by incidents associated with the threat class. Such an analysis may 
shed some light on whether the scientific and professional communities and industry are 
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striving to mitigate relevant attacks. This important analysis was not performed, because 
we were unable to find reliable sources for the number of incidents associated with each 
threat class and damage estimates for each incident.     
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